- •Contents
- •Preface
- •Acknowledgments
- •Table of cases
- •Table of statutes
- •Table of statutory instruments
- •Table of treaties
- •Table of EC legislation
- •1 Property law: the issues
- •1.1. Basic definition
- •1.2. Illustrative example
- •1.2.1. John
- •1.2.1.1. The unexcised body cell and the question of ownership
- •1.2.1.2. John’s interest in the excised body cell
- •1.2.1.3. Continuity of interests and John’s interest in the cell line
- •1.2.1.4. Enforceability of John’s interest in the cell line
- •1.2.2. Dr A and Dr B and the acquisition and transmission of property interests
- •1.2.3. The drugs company: constraints on the exercise of property rights
- •Notes and Questions 1.1
- •2 What we mean by ‘property’
- •2.1. Introduction
- •2.1.1. Property as a relationship and as a thing
- •2.1.2. Conceptualising ‘things’
- •2.1.3. Distinguishing property rights from other rights relating to things
- •2.1.4. Rights and other entitlements: Hohfeld’s rights analysis
- •2.1.4.1. Rights and duties, privileges and no-rights
- •2.1.4.2. Privileges and no-rights, and powers and liabilities
- •Abandonment
- •Effect of restrictions on alienation rights
- •2.1.4.3. Powers and liabilities, immunities and disabilities
- •2.1.5. Hohfeldian analysis of dynamic property relationships
- •2.1.5.1. Stage 1: Before the grant of the option
- •2.1.5.2. Stage 2: Grant of the option
- •2.1.5.3. Stage 3: Exercise of the option
- •2.1.6. Property rights, property interests and ownership
- •Notes and Questions 2.1
- •2.2. Private property, communal property, state property and no property
- •2.2.1. Introduction
- •2.2.2.1. No-property: ownerless things
- •2.2.2.2. Open access communal property
- •Distinction between open access and limited access communal property
- •Distinction between open access communal property and no property
- •Distinction between open access communal property and state property
- •Distinction between allocation and provision of resources
- •Regulation of communal property
- •2.2.2.3. Limited access communal property
- •Distinction between communal property and co-ownership
- •Particular use rights rather than general use rights
- •2.2.2.4. State property
- •2.2.2.5. Anticommons property
- •2.3. Economic analysis of property rights
- •2.3.1. What economic analysis seeks to achieve
- •Notes and Questions 2.2
- •2.3.2. Key concepts in the economic analysis of property rights
- •2.3.2.1. Externalities
- •2.3.2.2. Transaction costs
- •Imperfect information
- •Costs of collective action
- •Free-riders and holdouts
- •2.3.2.3. Efficiency
- •Value
- •Pareto efficiency
- •Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
- •2.4. Things as thing and things as wealth
- •2.4.1. Functions of things
- •2.4.2. The idea of a fund
- •2.4.3. Thing versus wealth
- •2.4.4. Related conceptions
- •2.4.4.1. Fungibles and non-fungibles
- •2.4.4.2. ‘Use value’ and ‘exchange value’
- •2.4.4.3. Property and personhood
- •Use value/exchange value
- •A functional distinction
- •Notes and Questions 2.3
- •3 Justifications for property rights
- •3.1. Introduction: general and specific justifications
- •3.2. Economic justification of property rights
- •3.2.1. Property and scarcity
- •Notes and Questions 3.1
- •3.2.2. Viability of single property systems
- •3.2.3. Criteria for measuring the success of a particular form of ownership
- •3.3. John Locke’s justification for private property
- •3.3.1. What Locke was attempting to establish
- •3.3.2. The political context
- •3.3.3. The problem of consent
- •3.3.4. Locke’s justification for original acquisition
- •3.3.5. The nature of Locke’s commons
- •3.3.6. Why mixing labour with a thing should give rise to entitlement
- •3.3.7. The sufficiency proviso
- •3.3.8. The spoilation proviso
- •3.3.9. The theological dimension to Locke’s theory
- •3.3.10. Present relevance of Locke’s theory
- •Notes and Questions 3.2
- •4 Allocating property rights
- •4.1. Introduction
- •4.2. The first occupancy rule
- •4.2.1. Intuitive ordering
- •4.2.2. Preservation of public order
- •4.2.3. Simplicity
- •4.2.4. Signalling
- •4.2.5. The bond between person and possessions
- •4.2.6. The libertarian justification
- •4.2.7. The communitarian objection
- •4.2.8. Economic efficiency
- •Notes and Questions 4.1
- •4.3. New things
- •Notes and Questions 4.2
- •4.4. Capture
- •Notes and Questions 4.3
- •5.2. Iron-holds-the-whale
- •5.3. Split ownership
- •4.5. Colonisation and property rights
- •4.5.1. Introduction
- •4.5.2. The Milirrpum decision and the doctrine of terra nullius
- •4.5.3. Mabo (No. 2)
- •4.5.3.1. Terra nullius
- •4.5.3.2. Property, sovereignty and the doctrine of radical title
- •4.5.3.3. Extinguishment
- •Express extinguishment
- •Implied extinguishment by inconsistent grant
- •Abandonment
- •Surrender but not alienation
- •Notes and Questions 4.4
- •4.5.4. Developments since Mabo (No. 2)
- •5 Personal and proprietary interests
- •5.1. Characteristics of proprietary interests
- •5.1.1. General enforceability
- •5.1.2. Identifiability of subject-matter
- •5.1.2.1. The basic principle
- •5.1.2.2. Fluctuating assets
- •5.1.3. Significance of alienability
- •5.1.3.1. Inalienability of communal property
- •5.1.3.2. Status rights
- •5.1.3.3. Appurtenant rights
- •5.1.4. Requirement for certainty
- •5.1.5. The numerus clausus of property interests
- •5.1.6. Vindication of property rights
- •5.1.7. Termination
- •5.1.7.1. Abandonment
- •5.1.7.2. Disclaimer
- •5.1.7.3. Forfeiture
- •5.1.8. Property rights and insolvency
- •5.2. Special features of communal property rights
- •5.2.1. Present scope of communal property
- •5.2.1.1. Rights of common
- •5.2.1.2. Customary rights
- •Notes and Questions 5.1
- •5.3. Aboriginal land rights
- •5.3.1. Nature of native title
- •5.3.2. Alienability
- •5.3.3. Abandonment
- •5.3.4. Variation
- •5.3.5. Extent of native title
- •5.3.6. Is native title proprietary?
- •5.3.6.1. Blackburn J’s view in Milirrpum
- •5.3.6.2. The view of the High Court in Mabo (No. 2)
- •5.3.6.3. The Canadian view
- •Notes and Questions 5.2
- •6 Ownership
- •6.1. The nature of ownership
- •6.1.1. The basis of ownership
- •6.1.1.1. Ownership and people
- •6.1.1.2. Ownership and things
- •6.1.2. An outline of the difficulties encountered in any consideration of ownership
- •6.1.2.1. The different meanings of ownership
- •6.1.2.2. Disagreements about ownership
- •6.1.2.3. Contradictions within ownership
- •6.1.2.4. The division of ownership
- •Between different types of owner
- •Between owners and non-owners
- •Notes and Questions 6.1
- •Notes and Questions 6.2
- •6.2. The contents of ownership
- •Notes and Questions 6.3
- •Notes and Questions 6.4
- •6.3. The roles played by ownership
- •6.3.1. As a legal term of art
- •6.3.1.1. Ownership’s role in land
- •6.3.1.2. Ownership’s role in chattels
- •6.3.1.3. Ownership’s role in legislation
- •6.3.2. As an amorphous notion
- •6.3.2.1. Ownership as an organising idea
- •6.3.2.2. Ownership as a contested concept
- •6.4. The limitations of ownership
- •6.4.1. Nuisance
- •6.4.1.1. A brief introduction to nuisance
- •Public nuisance
- •Private nuisance
- •6.4.1.2. The requirements of private nuisance
- •6.4.1.3. Private nuisance and private property
- •What is protected?
- •6.4.1.4. The allocation of entitlements
- •The traditional criteria
- •The role of the market
- •The role of public policy
- •6.4.1.5. The protection of entitlements
- •Property rules
- •Liability rules
- •Rules of inalienability
- •Notes and Questions 6.5
- •Notes and Questions 6.6
- •Notes and Questions 6.7
- •Notes and Questions 6.8
- •Notes and Questions 6.9
- •A. Property and liability rules
- •B. Inalienable entitlements
- •Notes and Questions 6.10
- •6.5. Restrictive covenants
- •Notes and Questions 6.11
- •Notes and Questions 6.12
- •7 Possession
- •7.1. The nature of possession
- •7.1.1. Introduction
- •7.1.2. Possession, ownership and proprietary interests
- •7.1.3. What is possession?
- •7.1.3.1. Factual control
- •The relevance of title
- •The nature of the thing possessed
- •The purpose for which the thing is used
- •Control through agents and control of contents
- •7.1.3.2. Intention required
- •Intention to exclude
- •Effect of ignorance
- •Notes and Questions 7.1
- •7.2. Possession of land
- •7.2.1. Leases and licences
- •7.2.1.1. Why the distinction matters
- •7.2.1.2. Distinguishing leases from licences
- •Notes and Questions 7.2
- •7.2.2. Possession and particular use rights
- •7.2.2.1. General and particular use rights
- •7.2.2.2. Compatibility of particular and general use rights
- •7.3. Possession of goods: bailment
- •7.3.1. Nature of bailment
- •7.3.2. Rights, duties and obligations of bailor and bailee
- •7.4. Protection of possession
- •7.4.1. Protection of property rights by protection of possession
- •7.4.2. Tort and the protection of property rights
- •7.4.2.1. The role of tort in the protection of property rights
- •7.4.2.2. Scope of the property torts
- •Conversion
- •What amounts to a conversion of goods?
- •Remedies
- •Trespass
- •What amounts to trespass
- •Remedies
- •7.4.3. Self-help remedies
- •7.4.3.1. Survival of self-help remedies
- •7.4.3.2. Restrictions and deterrents
- •7.4.4. Unlawful eviction and harassment
- •7.4.5. Trespassing and the criminal law
- •Notes and Questions 7.3
- •8 Fragmentation of ownership
- •8.1. Introduction
- •8.2. Present and future interests
- •8.2.1. Interests in possession, in reversion and in remainder
- •8.2.2. Absolute entitlements, contingent entitlements and mere expectancies
- •8.2.2.1. Absolute entitlements
- •8.2.2.2. Contingent interests and expectancies
- •8.2.2.3. Alternative contingencies
- •8.2.3. When interests vest
- •8.2.4. Alienation, management and control
- •8.2.5. Interests of contingent duration
- •8.2.5.1. Determinable interests
- •8.2.5.2. Interests subject to a condition subsequent
- •8.2.5.3. Distinguishing determinable and forfeitable interests
- •8.2.6. Requirement of certainty
- •8.2.7. Successive interests in land and the doctrine of tenures and estates
- •8.2.7.1. Tenures and estates
- •8.2.7.2. Estates in particular use rights
- •8.2.7.3. Leases
- •8.2.8. Restrictions on the power to create future interests
- •8.3. Legal and equitable interests
- •8.3.1. Origin of the legal/equitable distinction
- •8.3.1.1. Failed formality interests
- •8.3.1.2. Novel interests
- •8.3.2. Legal and equitable interests now
- •8.3.2.1. Interests in land
- •8.3.2.2. Interests in goods
- •8.3.3. The significance of the legal/equitable distinction
- •8.3.4. Three common fallacies
- •8.3.4.1. Equitable interests and beneficial interests
- •8.3.4.2. Over-identification of equitable interests with trusts
- •8.3.4.3. Absolute ownership does not include equitable beneficial ownership
- •Notes and Questions 8.1
- •8.4. Fragmentation of management, control and benefit
- •8.4.1. Corporate property holding
- •8.4.2. Managerial property holding
- •8.4.2.1. Trust
- •The trustee
- •The settlor
- •The beneficiaries
- •8.4.2.2. Administration of property on death
- •8.4.2.3. Bankruptcy and liquidation
- •Notes and Questions 8.2
- •8.5. Group ownership
- •8.6. General and particular use rights
- •Notes and Questions 8.3
- •9 Recognition of new property interests
- •9.1. Why are certain interests regarded as property?
- •9.1.1. The function of property
- •9.1.1.1. As a means of allocating scarce resources
- •9.1.1.2. As an incentive to promote their management
- •9.1.1.3. As a moral, philosophical or political statement
- •9.1.2. The danger of property
- •9.1.3. The requirements of property
- •9.2. The dynamic nature of property
- •9.2.1. The recognition and limits of the covenant as a proprietary interest
- •Notes and Questions 9.1
- •9.2.2. The recognition of a proprietary right to occupy the matrimonial home
- •Notes and Questions 9.2
- •9.3. The general reluctance to recognise new property rights
- •9.3.1. The facts of Victoria Park Racing v. Taylor
- •9.3.2. The views of the majority
- •9.3.3. The views of the minority
- •9.3.4. The significance of the case
- •Notes and Questions 9.3
- •9.4. A comparative confirmation and an economic critique
- •Notes and Questions 9.4
- •9.5. The future of property
- •9.5.1. The new property thesis
- •Notes and Questions 9.5
- •Notes and Questions 9.6
- •10 Title
- •10.1. What we mean by ‘title’
- •10.2. Acquiring title: derivative and original acquisition of title
- •10.2.1. Derivative acquisition: disposition or grant
- •10.2.2. Original acquisition
- •10.3. Relativity of title
- •10.4. Proving title
- •10.4.1. Role of registration
- •10.4.2. Possession as a root of title
- •10.4.3. Provenance
- •10.4.4. Extinguishing title by limitation of action rules
- •10.4.5. Relativity of title and the ius tertii
- •10.5. The nemo dat rule
- •10.5.1. Scope of the nemo dat rule
- •10.5.2. General principles applicable to all property
- •10.5.2.1. Registration and the nemo dat rule
- •10.5.2.2. Dispositions to volunteers
- •10.5.2.3. Powers of sale
- •10.5.3. The application of the nemo dat rule to goods
- •10.5.4. The application of the nemo dat rule to money
- •10.5.5. The application of the nemo dat rule to land
- •10.5.5.1. The general principle
- •10.5.5.2. After-acquired property
- •10.5.5.3. Interests by estoppel
- •10.6. Legal and equitable title
- •11 Acquiring title by possession
- •11.1. Introduction
- •11.2. The operation of adverse possession rules
- •11.2.1. Unregistered land
- •11.2.2. Registered land
- •11.2.3. What counts as ‘adverse’ possession
- •11.2.4. Effect on third party interests
- •11.3. Why established possession should defeat the paper owner
- •11.4. Adverse possession and registration
- •11.5. Good faith and the adverse possessor
- •1. Tension between principle and proof
- •Notes and Questions 11.1
- •A. Lockean entitlement
- •B. Utilitarianism
- •C. Property and personhood
- •B. Property theory and adverse possession
- •Notes and Questions 11.2
- •Notes and Questions 11.3
- •Stale claims in registered land
- •Stale claims under the 2002 Act
- •Distinguishing the ‘good’ squatter from the ‘bad’ squatter
- •Problems of proof
- •Effect of the 2002 Act changes on the incidence of adverse possession
- •The incompatibility argument
- •Notes and Questions 11.4
- •11.6. Goods
- •11.6.1. Taking and theft
- •11.6.2. Protection of title by tort
- •11.6.3. The Limitation Act 1980 and title to goods
- •11.6.4. Finders
- •Notes and Questions 11.5
- •12 Transfer and grant
- •12.1. Derivative acquisition
- •12.2. Formalities
- •12.2.1. Nature and content of formalities rules
- •12.2.2. Registration and electronic transactions
- •12.2.3. Validity and enforceability against third parties
- •12.2.4. Effect of compliance on passing of title
- •12.2.5. Transactions excepted from formalities rules
- •12.2.5.1. Equitable modification of legal rules
- •12.2.5.2. Implied rights
- •12.2.5.3. Rights acquired by possession or prescription
- •12.2.6. Deeds and prescribed forms
- •12.2.7. Why have formalities rules
- •12.2.7.1. The evidentiary function
- •12.2.7.2. The cautionary function
- •12.2.7.3. The channelling function
- •12.2.7.4. Other functions
- •Clarifying terms
- •Publicity
- •State functions
- •12.2.8. Disadvantages
- •12.2.8.1. Hard cases
- •12.2.8.2. Costs
- •Notes and Questions 12.1
- •Notes and Questions 12.2
- •12.3. Contractual rights to property interests
- •12.3.1. Estate contracts and the rule in Walsh v. Lonsdale
- •12.3.2. Application to property other than land
- •12.3.3. The failed formalities rule
- •12.3.3.1. The general rule
- •12.3.3.2. The failed formalities rule as it applies to land
- •12.3.3.3. Failed formalities rule as it applies to other property
- •Notes and Questions 12.3
- •Notes and Questions 12.4
- •12.3.4. Options to purchase, rights of pre-emption and rights of first refusal
- •Notes and Questions 12.5
- •Notes and Questions 12.6
- •12.4. Unascertained property
- •12.4.1. The problem of identification
- •12.4.2. Unascertained goods
- •12.4.3. Other unascertained property
- •Notes and Questions 12.7
- •13 Acquiring interests by other methods
- •13.1. Introduction
- •13.2. The difference between adverse possession and prescription
- •13.3. Why long use should give rise to entitlement
- •13.4. Rationale
- •13.4.1. Ascendancy of the presumed grant rationale
- •13.4.2. Effect of the ‘revolting fiction’
- •13.5. When long use gives rise to a prescriptive right
- •13.5.1. The problem of negative uses
- •13.5.2. Rights that can be granted but not acquired by prescription
- •13.6. User as of right and the problem of acquiescence
- •13.7. The future of prescription
- •Recommendation in favour of abolition
- •Minority view in favour of retention
- •Notes and Questions 13.1
- •14 Enforceability and priority of interests
- •14.1. Rationale of enforceability and priority rules
- •14.2. Enforceability and priority rules
- •14.2.1. The basic rules
- •14.2.2. Impact of registration
- •Notes and Questions 14.1
- •14.3. The doctrine of notice
- •14.3.1. Notice
- •14.3.2. Good faith
- •14.3.3. Effectiveness of the doctrine of notice as an enforceability rule
- •Notes and Questions 14.2
- •14.4. Overreaching
- •14.4.1. Nature and scope of overreaching
- •14.4.2. Operation of overreaching
- •14.4.3. Overreaching the interests of occupying beneficiaries
- •14.4.4. Transactions capable of overreaching beneficiaries’ interests
- •14.4.5. The two-trustees rule
- •Introductory
- •Overreaching
- •Safeguard for beneficiaries
- •Change of circumstances
- •Protecting occupation of property
- •Principal recommendation
- •Notes and Questions 14.3
- •15 Registration
- •15.1. What are registration systems for?
- •15.2. Characteristics of the English land registration system
- •15.2.1. Privacy
- •15.2.2. Comprehensiveness
- •15.2.3. Boundaries
- •15.2.4. Restricted class of registrable interests
- •15.2.4.1. Distinguishing ‘substantive’ registration and ‘protection’ on the register
- •15.2.4.2. Registration
- •15.2.4.3. ‘Protection’ by notice or restriction
- •15.2.4.4. The overriding interest class
- •15.2.5. The mirror, curtain and guarantee principles
- •THE ‘MIRROR PRINCIPLE’
- •THE ‘CURTAIN PRINCIPLE’
- •15.2.6. Consequences of non-registration
- •Notes and Questions 15.1
- •Compulsory use of electronic conveyancing
- •Do-it-yourself conveyancing
- •The objective of the power
- •The application of the power
- •Notes and Questions 15.2
- •15.3. Enforceability and priority of interests under the Land Registration Act 2002
- •15.3.1. Registrable interests
- •15.3.2. All other interests
- •15.3.2.1. Enforceability
- •15.3.2.2. Priority
- •15.4. Overriding interests
- •15.4.1. Justifications for overriding interests
- •15.4.2. Principles to be applied
- •15.4.3. Overriding interests under the 2002 Act
- •15.4.4. Easements and profits
- •15.4.5. Interests of persons in actual occupation: the 1925 Act
- •15.4.5.1. What rights are covered?
- •5.4.5.2. Actual occupation
- •Physical presence
- •Personal occupation
- •Non-residential premises
- •15.4.6. Interests of persons in actual occupation: the 2002 Act
- •15.4.6.1. Causal link between interest and occupation
- •15.4.6.2. Meaning of ‘actual occupation’
- •15.4.6.3. The ‘notice’ element
- •15.4.6.4. Can minors be in actual occupation?
- •15.4.6.5. Occupation of part
- •15.4.7. Complexity
- •Notes and Questions 15.3
- •15.5. Indemnity
- •15.5.1. Function of indemnity
- •15.5.2. Shortfall in the provision of indemnity
- •15.5.3. Cost
- •17 Leases and bailment
- •17.1. Introduction
- •17.2. Leases and bailments compared
- •17.2.1. Consensuality
- •17.2.2. Contract
- •17.2.3. Enforcement
- •17.2.4. Duration and purpose
- •17.2.5. Beneficial use
- •17.2.6. Proprietary status
- •17.2.7. Inherent obligations of the possessor
- •17.3. Leases
- •17.3.1. Nature of the lease
- •17.3.1.1. Duration: the four basic categories
- •The legal position
- •Length of fixed-term leases in practice
- •Commonhold as an alternative to the long residential lease
- •Commercial premises
- •Assignment and premature termination of fixed-term lease
- •17.3.1.3. Periodic tenancies
- •Nature
- •Contractual fetters on notice to quit
- •17.3.1.4. Tenancy at will
- •Tenancy at sufferance
- •Notes and Questions 17.1
- •17.3.1.5. Certainty of duration
- •Notes and Questions 17.2
- •Passage 2
- •Passage 3
- •Passage 4
- •Notes and Questions 17.3
- •17.3.1.7. The tolerated trespasser status
- •Notes and Questions 17.4
- •Notes and Questions 17.5
- •17.3.2. Alienability
- •17.3.2.1. Inherent alienability
- •Alienability of tenant’s interest
- •Subleases and other derivative interests granted by the tenant
- •Effect of termination of lease on derivative interests
- •Alienability of landlord’s interest
- •Concurrent leases and other derivative interests granted by the landlord
- •17.3.2.2. Restrictions on alienability
- •17.3.2.3. Statutory control of contractual restrictions
- •Notes and Questions 17.6
- •17.3.3. Effect of alienation on enforceability
- •17.3.3.1. Introduction: the basic principle
- •Automatic transmission of benefit and burden of proprietary terms: the privity of estate principle
- •Post-assignment liability: the privity of contract principle
- •17.3.3.3. Derivative interest holders
- •17.4. Bailment
- •17.4.1. Essential features of bailment
- •17.4.2. Categories of bailment
- •17.4.3. Characteristics of bailment
- •17.4.4. Liabilities of the bailee
- •Notes and Questions 17.7
- •17.4.5. Is bailment proprietary?
- •17.4.5.1. Possession and exclusivity
- •17.4.5.2. Alienability
- •17.4.5.3. Enforceability against third parties
- •17.4.5.4. Other proprietary indicia
- •18 Security interests
- •18.1. The nature and function of security
- •18.1.1. Nature of security
- •18.1.1.1. Terminology problems
- •18.1.1.2. Legal and equitable rights to redeem
- •18.1.1.3. Creation, attachment and perfection of security
- •18.1.2. Function
- •18.1.2.1. Right of first recourse
- •18.1.2.2. Attachment to the asset
- •18.1.2.4. The hostage function
- •18.1.2.5. Signalling, monitoring and control
- •18.1.3. Efficiency
- •18.1.4. Use of security
- •18.2. Forms of security
- •18.2.1. Property transfer securities: the mortgage
- •18.2.2. Possessory securities: pledge or pawn
- •18.2.3. Hypothecations: the charge
- •18.2.4. Liens
- •18.2.5. Property retention securities
- •18.2.6. Charge by way of legal mortgage
- •Notes and Questions 18.1
- •18.3. Control over the terms of the relationship
- •18.3.1. Equitable supervisory jurisdiction
- •18.3.2. The Kreglinger principles
- •18.3.3. Statutory intervention
- •Notes and Questions 18.2
- •18.4. Enforcement of security
- •18.4.1. Remedies
- •18.4.2. Possession
- •18.4.3. Sale
- •18.4.3.1. When the power arises
- •18.4.3.2. When the power becomes exercisable
- •18.4.4. Duties on enforcement
- •General principles
- •The handling of arrears: initial action taken by lenders
- •Alleviating arrears problems
- •The levying of charges on accounts in arrear
- •Methods of obtaining possession
- •Proceeds of sale
- •Indemnity insurance
- •Loss recovery procedures
- •Notes and Questions 18.3
- •16 Co-ownership
- •16.1. Introduction
- •16.2.1. Basic concepts
- •OWNERSHIP IN COMMON
- •JOINT OWNERSHIP
- •CONCURRENT INTERESTS IN FINANCIAL ASSETS
- •CONCURRENT INTERESTS IN LAND
- •Notes and Questions 16.1
- •Unity of possession
- •Unity of interest
- •Unity of title
- •Unity of time
- •16.2.2. A comparison of joint tenancies and tenancies in common
- •16.2.2.1. Four unities versus one
- •Notes and Questions 16.2
- •16.2.2.2. The right of survivorship (and how to avoid it)
- •Severance at common law
- •16.2.2.3. Acting upon one’s share
- •16.2.2.4. Mutual agreement
- •16.2.2.5. Mutual conduct
- •16.2.2.6. Statutory severance
- •Notes and Questions 16.3
- •16.2.3. Use of co-owned property
- •16.2.3.1. Land
- •12 THE RIGHT TO OCCUPY
- •13 EXCLUSION AND RESTRICTION OF RIGHT TO OCCUPY
- •Notes and Questions 16.4
- •16.2.3.2. Chattels
- •Notes and Questions 16.5
- •16.2.4. Sale and other dispositions of co-owned property
- •16.2.4.1. Land
- •Notes and Questions 16.6
- •16.2.4.2. Chattels
- •16.3. Other forms of co-ownership
- •16.3.1. Commonhold
- •16.3.2. Unincorporated associations
- •Notes and Questions 16.7
- •16.3.3. Extending the limits of co-ownership: public trusts
- •Bibliography
- •Index
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5What facts might give rise to exceptional circumstances under section 335A(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986? What was really exceptional in the facts of Re Holliday [1981] Ch 405?
6How do the provisions of sections 14–15 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 and sections 335A–337 of the Insolvency Act 1986 dovetail with the provisions concerning the family to be found in section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 15 of the Children Act 1989 and Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 (see White v. White [2003] EWCA Civ 924)?
7 Does the Human Rights Act 1998 have any role to play in this area?
16.2.4.2.Chattels
A purported sale by a co-owner of the entire interest without the consent of the other co-owners will be subject to the nemo dat rule and (unless one of the exceptions applies – see section 10.5 above) the purchaser will only acquire the seller’s own interest which he will henceforth hold as tenant in common with the other co-owners. A co-owner who destroys or disposes of his fellow co-owners’ interests is liable in conversion under section 10 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977. This liability extends to situations where the co-owner purports to dispose of the entire interest even in circumstances where the other co-owners’ interests are not lost, although this applies only to situations where he has purported to dispose of the entire interest rather than some lesser interest such as pledge or bailment.
16.3. Other forms of co-ownership
16.3.1. Commonhold
As we shall see in Chapter 17, a new form of statutory co-ownership has been introduced under the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 to help alleviate the problems faced by owners of flats particularly in multi-unit developments where the leasehold model has not generally proved a success in providing effective management of the common areas and resources. Commonhold uses the company structure to provide the freehold owners of individual units with membership of a commonhold association with its own legal personality in which the common parts of the development are vested. Only the unit-holders are permitted to belong to the association which is governed according to rules and regulations agreed by the membership and publicised via a ‘Commonhold Community Statement’.
16.3.2. Unincorporated associations
The unincorporated association creates real difficulties for lawyers, for, as the name so crudely asserts, unlike the commonhold associations considered above,
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they lack a corporate identity and thus have no legal personality. Some commentators have gone so far as to state that they do not therefore exist, and, while this is plainly not so, it is equally clear that they occupy a twilight legal world in which their existence is admitted but not wholly catered for (see Rideout, ‘The Limited Liability of Unincorporated Associations’). The difficulties are most acute when property is purportedly given to such an association, for the law is then faced with the seemingly insoluble problem of trying to vest property in something in which title cannot vest. As many of these gifts take the form of testamentary dispositions (where the willing donor thus has no second chance to perfect his gift), the courts are rightly reluctant to declare them void and therefore embark upon often ingenious, but rarely convincing, attempts to solve the conundrum.
There were originally two basic ways in which a donor’s gift to an unincorporated association might be construed (in the absence of the gift being construed as a charitable disposition or one of the small category of anomalous purpose trusts). The simplest method was to regard it as an outright gift to the existing members of the association, each of whom had a legal personality in which the interest could vest via either a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common. Despite its simplicity, there were two major drawbacks with this approach. First, with the rare exception of gifts intended to benefit existing members only, it did not perfect the gift in the way the donor intended. For, as a tenant in common (either from the outset or after unilaterally severing the joint tenancy), an individual member had an undivided share which he could do with as he liked without any obligation to use it in accordance with the purposes for which it was made. Secondly (in theory, if not in practice), there were onerous formal requirements to be met every time the membership of the association changed: under section 53(1)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925, any member who subsequently left retained his interest unless he disposed of it by signed writing; any member who subsequently joined received no interest unless assigned to him in a similar fashion; while (save for joint tenants) even a member who died did not thereby lose his interest which devolved according to his will or intestacy.
The other way in which a gift might be validated was to regard it, not as an outright disposition, but as a gift on trust either for the purposes of the association or for present and future members. This did, indeed, avoid the drawbacks associated with absolute dispositions. Rather than ignoring the donor’s wishes, these were now given priority under the terms of the trust. Equally, the formality issues were side-stepped because the gift did not vest in the current membership but was an endowment in which the capital was preserved with only the interest expended upon the present members and/or the current purposes. But the price paid was a high one. As a gift on endowment, there were very real perpetuity problems which meant that, unless limited to the perpetuity period, the trust would be void from the outset (Leahy v. Attorney-General for New South Wales [1959] AC 457). While, if held to be a gift for the purposes of the association, it was additionally liable to be regarded as a purpose trust which offended the beneficiary principle because the
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beneficial interest was unowned. Admittedly, the courts did develop haphazard strategies to overcome these problems: occasionally appearing to regard unincorporated associations as exceptions to the beneficiary principle; and at other times avoiding perpetuity problems by regarding the trust as limited to current (and not future) members (Re Drummond [1914] 2 Ch 90, in which case it was unclear how it did not take effect as an absolute gift with all the attendant problems considered above). Notwithstanding such devices, the general position remained that a gift on trust for the purposes of the association or for its present and future members was liable to fail.
As a consequence, and despite the weaknesses in the first construction, a presumption developed in its favour, with the courts doing their best to validate gifts to unincorporated associations by, where possible, construing them as absolute dispositions to the current membership. But, while this preserved the gift, it did not take account of the donor’s wishes and provided no means by which a disposition could be made in favour of present and future members. In the face of this, Cross J in Neville Estates v. Madden [1962] Ch 832 at 849 offered a third possible construction. Under this approach, there was still ‘a gift to the existing members . . . but subject to their respective contractual rights and liabilities towards one another as members of the association’. Thus, while the gift would vest in each member, it would do so subject to contractual obligations preventing them from taking their share and doing with it what they will. This is clearly a better solution, but it does not answer all the difficulties. For a start, the court has to be able to find either express or implied terms which contain such mutual undertakings which is not always possible (there was no contract between the members of the various orders in Leahy v. Attorney-General for New South Wales
[1959] AC 457, for example). And, even if these can be established, we are still confronted by the formality problems that dog the first solution. Admittedly, the inter vivos requirements of the Law of Property Act 1925 could conceivably be catered for under a suitably drafted contract which each member might be made to sign upon joining; but the same could not be done in respect of the post mortem requirements of the Wills Act 1837. More fundamentally, despite appearances to the contrary, this construction does not (technically at least) take us much further in complying with the donor’s intentions. It is not the terms of the gift, after all, but the rules of the association which determine whether or not the gift can be construed in such a way (see Matthews, ‘A Problem in the Construction of Gifts to Unincorporated Associations’). Admittedly, in determining the rules, the courts do (by means of the implied term) engage in a degree of artistic licence, but the carrot is here wagging the dog with the gift, in effect dictating the rules. Furthermore, the rules can normally be changed (and according to some must always be capable of so being – per Vinelott J in Re Grant [1979] 3 All ER 359) which means that a gift which the donor specifically did not intend to pass to the membership will do just that, for instance on dissolution or as the result of a members’ ballot.
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Despite these and other more questionable criticisms, the ‘contract holding theory’ (as it soon became known) is the new orthodoxy. Yet it is at best little more than a fudge which relegates the wishes of the donor to the margins. This can ultimately be traced back to the courts’ implicit assumption that the problem is essentially a private property matter which can best be solved by private law solutions. Thus gifts to unincorporated associations are made to vest in individual members of the association with scant regard for the formal difficulties of such an approach, nor the essential artificiality of construing a gift to the association as a gift to its members. But why are we so constrained? An unincorporated association is clearly an example of communal ownership in which the members of the association form the community. As Macpherson noted in ‘Human Rights as Property Rights’, under communal ownership the primary right of each individual is the right not to be excluded from the communal resource and is derived, not from the vesting of a particular interest, but from one’s status as a member of a community. Thus we do not need to concern ourselves with the formal requirements of vesting because no vesting takes place. And, as a consequence, there are no legal formalities with which to comply when someone either acquires that status upon joining the association or loses it at the moment they leave (whether at the behest of themselves or their fellow members or after the seductive embrace of the grim reaper).
Now some will argue that all of this is foreign to the common law. But, as we showed in Chapter 2, notions of communal property pre-date what are often regarded as fundamental principles of English law such as the doctrine of tenure. More importantly, they continue to play a fundamental role including in specific areas such as common land, public rights of way, public spaces and highways, rights of navigation, and fishing rights, and more generally by fixing the limits of private property which is always circumscribed (to differing extents depending upon the type and nature of the thing) in deference to the wider interests of the community. And, while many of these issues will be played out beyond the narrow confines of the Chancery lawyer’s field of competence, in areas as diverse as the law of obligations (e.g. Hunter v. Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655), public law (e.g. sections 79–82 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990) and the criminal law (e.g. section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1972), this is by no means always so, and nor does it, in any sense, weaken the argument (see New Windsor Corp. v. Mellor [1975] 3 All ER 44; Attorney-General, ex rel. Yorkshire Derwent Trust v. Brotherton [1991] 3 WLR 1126; and Kohler, ‘The Whittling Away of Way’).
Even if one accepts the theoretical possibility of a communal property analysis of unincorporated associations, this does not, of itself, provide a means by which a gift to such an association will be perfected. However, developments in the law of trusts have provided an analysis which squares the circle of communal ownership with the necessary vesting of the formal legal title. In Re Denley [1969] 1 Ch 393, money was left on trust to provide a sports ground primarily for the use of company employees. Counsel for the residuary legatees argued that this was a
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void purpose trust which contravened the beneficiary principle (as the beneficial interest was not vested in anyone). However, in an imaginative judgment, Goff J held that the trust was valid, despite the beneficial interest being unowned, because there were indirect beneficiaries (the company employees) who, despite not owning the trust property, still had locus standi to enforce the trustees’ obligations.
The decision is a highly practical and sensible one and mirrors to some extent the position which pertains in respect of personal representatives who hold the legal title of the deceased’s estate subject to the control, but not on behalf of, the beneficiaries under the will who are not, at that stage at least, regarded in law as owning the equitable interest. It also has an obvious application to unincorporated associations, as recognised generally by textbook writers who see in it a means of dealing with some of the difficulties that arise in respect of gifts on endowment. In the light of Re Denley, the members for the time being will be the indirect beneficiaries with locus standi to enforce the trust whenever a gift is made for the purposes of an association. Thus the only problem with gifts on endowment becomes one of perpetuity, which can always be dealt with by means of a suitably drafted disposition limiting the trust to the perpetuity period, at which point the capital passes either under the terms of the trust or under the principle of resulting trusts. But even this is not certain, for it is possible to argue that Re Denley-type purpose trusts are saved by the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964 from invalidity because they are subject to the rule against remoteness of vesting rather than the rule against inalienability and are thus outside the exclusionary terms of section 15(4) (see Hayton and Marshall, Cases and Commentary on the Law of Trusts (9th edn), p. 196 – but cf. (10th edn), pp. 200–2). This is, however, of little solace when most gifts to unincorporated associations are not by way of endowment and, even where it is possible to construe a gift in this way, the courts lean heavily towards the ‘contract holding’ analysis.
Yet there is no reason why the Re Denley approach should be restricted to gifts on endowment. It is surely possible to construe any gift to an unincorporated association in this manner so that legal title vests in the officers of the association who are empowered to spend both interest and capital on the purposes of the trust with individual members having locus standi to enforce its terms but with no Saunders v. Vautier (1841) 10 LJ Ch 354 right to vary them or claim the beneficial interest for themselves. Admittedly, this does make the trust more inflexible but it would at least elevate the wishes of the donor above those of the membership who do, after all, retain the option of refusing the proffered gift. Once we had ventured down such a path, there might be room for manoeuvre allowing a degree of variation (not dissimilar to the cy-pre`s doctrine encountered in the law of charities) but stopping short of allowing the membership to claim the equitable interest as their own (see Gardner, ‘New Angles on Unincorporated Associations’).
The point appeared to be accepted in Re Lipinski [1977] 1 All ER 33, where (in dealing with a bequest held expressly to be not by way of endowment) Oliver J stated that Re Denley ‘accord[s] both with authority and common sense’. The case