- •Contents
- •Preface
- •Acknowledgments
- •Table of cases
- •Table of statutes
- •Table of statutory instruments
- •Table of treaties
- •Table of EC legislation
- •1 Property law: the issues
- •1.1. Basic definition
- •1.2. Illustrative example
- •1.2.1. John
- •1.2.1.1. The unexcised body cell and the question of ownership
- •1.2.1.2. John’s interest in the excised body cell
- •1.2.1.3. Continuity of interests and John’s interest in the cell line
- •1.2.1.4. Enforceability of John’s interest in the cell line
- •1.2.2. Dr A and Dr B and the acquisition and transmission of property interests
- •1.2.3. The drugs company: constraints on the exercise of property rights
- •Notes and Questions 1.1
- •2 What we mean by ‘property’
- •2.1. Introduction
- •2.1.1. Property as a relationship and as a thing
- •2.1.2. Conceptualising ‘things’
- •2.1.3. Distinguishing property rights from other rights relating to things
- •2.1.4. Rights and other entitlements: Hohfeld’s rights analysis
- •2.1.4.1. Rights and duties, privileges and no-rights
- •2.1.4.2. Privileges and no-rights, and powers and liabilities
- •Abandonment
- •Effect of restrictions on alienation rights
- •2.1.4.3. Powers and liabilities, immunities and disabilities
- •2.1.5. Hohfeldian analysis of dynamic property relationships
- •2.1.5.1. Stage 1: Before the grant of the option
- •2.1.5.2. Stage 2: Grant of the option
- •2.1.5.3. Stage 3: Exercise of the option
- •2.1.6. Property rights, property interests and ownership
- •Notes and Questions 2.1
- •2.2. Private property, communal property, state property and no property
- •2.2.1. Introduction
- •2.2.2.1. No-property: ownerless things
- •2.2.2.2. Open access communal property
- •Distinction between open access and limited access communal property
- •Distinction between open access communal property and no property
- •Distinction between open access communal property and state property
- •Distinction between allocation and provision of resources
- •Regulation of communal property
- •2.2.2.3. Limited access communal property
- •Distinction between communal property and co-ownership
- •Particular use rights rather than general use rights
- •2.2.2.4. State property
- •2.2.2.5. Anticommons property
- •2.3. Economic analysis of property rights
- •2.3.1. What economic analysis seeks to achieve
- •Notes and Questions 2.2
- •2.3.2. Key concepts in the economic analysis of property rights
- •2.3.2.1. Externalities
- •2.3.2.2. Transaction costs
- •Imperfect information
- •Costs of collective action
- •Free-riders and holdouts
- •2.3.2.3. Efficiency
- •Value
- •Pareto efficiency
- •Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
- •2.4. Things as thing and things as wealth
- •2.4.1. Functions of things
- •2.4.2. The idea of a fund
- •2.4.3. Thing versus wealth
- •2.4.4. Related conceptions
- •2.4.4.1. Fungibles and non-fungibles
- •2.4.4.2. ‘Use value’ and ‘exchange value’
- •2.4.4.3. Property and personhood
- •Use value/exchange value
- •A functional distinction
- •Notes and Questions 2.3
- •3 Justifications for property rights
- •3.1. Introduction: general and specific justifications
- •3.2. Economic justification of property rights
- •3.2.1. Property and scarcity
- •Notes and Questions 3.1
- •3.2.2. Viability of single property systems
- •3.2.3. Criteria for measuring the success of a particular form of ownership
- •3.3. John Locke’s justification for private property
- •3.3.1. What Locke was attempting to establish
- •3.3.2. The political context
- •3.3.3. The problem of consent
- •3.3.4. Locke’s justification for original acquisition
- •3.3.5. The nature of Locke’s commons
- •3.3.6. Why mixing labour with a thing should give rise to entitlement
- •3.3.7. The sufficiency proviso
- •3.3.8. The spoilation proviso
- •3.3.9. The theological dimension to Locke’s theory
- •3.3.10. Present relevance of Locke’s theory
- •Notes and Questions 3.2
- •4 Allocating property rights
- •4.1. Introduction
- •4.2. The first occupancy rule
- •4.2.1. Intuitive ordering
- •4.2.2. Preservation of public order
- •4.2.3. Simplicity
- •4.2.4. Signalling
- •4.2.5. The bond between person and possessions
- •4.2.6. The libertarian justification
- •4.2.7. The communitarian objection
- •4.2.8. Economic efficiency
- •Notes and Questions 4.1
- •4.3. New things
- •Notes and Questions 4.2
- •4.4. Capture
- •Notes and Questions 4.3
- •5.2. Iron-holds-the-whale
- •5.3. Split ownership
- •4.5. Colonisation and property rights
- •4.5.1. Introduction
- •4.5.2. The Milirrpum decision and the doctrine of terra nullius
- •4.5.3. Mabo (No. 2)
- •4.5.3.1. Terra nullius
- •4.5.3.2. Property, sovereignty and the doctrine of radical title
- •4.5.3.3. Extinguishment
- •Express extinguishment
- •Implied extinguishment by inconsistent grant
- •Abandonment
- •Surrender but not alienation
- •Notes and Questions 4.4
- •4.5.4. Developments since Mabo (No. 2)
- •5 Personal and proprietary interests
- •5.1. Characteristics of proprietary interests
- •5.1.1. General enforceability
- •5.1.2. Identifiability of subject-matter
- •5.1.2.1. The basic principle
- •5.1.2.2. Fluctuating assets
- •5.1.3. Significance of alienability
- •5.1.3.1. Inalienability of communal property
- •5.1.3.2. Status rights
- •5.1.3.3. Appurtenant rights
- •5.1.4. Requirement for certainty
- •5.1.5. The numerus clausus of property interests
- •5.1.6. Vindication of property rights
- •5.1.7. Termination
- •5.1.7.1. Abandonment
- •5.1.7.2. Disclaimer
- •5.1.7.3. Forfeiture
- •5.1.8. Property rights and insolvency
- •5.2. Special features of communal property rights
- •5.2.1. Present scope of communal property
- •5.2.1.1. Rights of common
- •5.2.1.2. Customary rights
- •Notes and Questions 5.1
- •5.3. Aboriginal land rights
- •5.3.1. Nature of native title
- •5.3.2. Alienability
- •5.3.3. Abandonment
- •5.3.4. Variation
- •5.3.5. Extent of native title
- •5.3.6. Is native title proprietary?
- •5.3.6.1. Blackburn J’s view in Milirrpum
- •5.3.6.2. The view of the High Court in Mabo (No. 2)
- •5.3.6.3. The Canadian view
- •Notes and Questions 5.2
- •6 Ownership
- •6.1. The nature of ownership
- •6.1.1. The basis of ownership
- •6.1.1.1. Ownership and people
- •6.1.1.2. Ownership and things
- •6.1.2. An outline of the difficulties encountered in any consideration of ownership
- •6.1.2.1. The different meanings of ownership
- •6.1.2.2. Disagreements about ownership
- •6.1.2.3. Contradictions within ownership
- •6.1.2.4. The division of ownership
- •Between different types of owner
- •Between owners and non-owners
- •Notes and Questions 6.1
- •Notes and Questions 6.2
- •6.2. The contents of ownership
- •Notes and Questions 6.3
- •Notes and Questions 6.4
- •6.3. The roles played by ownership
- •6.3.1. As a legal term of art
- •6.3.1.1. Ownership’s role in land
- •6.3.1.2. Ownership’s role in chattels
- •6.3.1.3. Ownership’s role in legislation
- •6.3.2. As an amorphous notion
- •6.3.2.1. Ownership as an organising idea
- •6.3.2.2. Ownership as a contested concept
- •6.4. The limitations of ownership
- •6.4.1. Nuisance
- •6.4.1.1. A brief introduction to nuisance
- •Public nuisance
- •Private nuisance
- •6.4.1.2. The requirements of private nuisance
- •6.4.1.3. Private nuisance and private property
- •What is protected?
- •6.4.1.4. The allocation of entitlements
- •The traditional criteria
- •The role of the market
- •The role of public policy
- •6.4.1.5. The protection of entitlements
- •Property rules
- •Liability rules
- •Rules of inalienability
- •Notes and Questions 6.5
- •Notes and Questions 6.6
- •Notes and Questions 6.7
- •Notes and Questions 6.8
- •Notes and Questions 6.9
- •A. Property and liability rules
- •B. Inalienable entitlements
- •Notes and Questions 6.10
- •6.5. Restrictive covenants
- •Notes and Questions 6.11
- •Notes and Questions 6.12
- •7 Possession
- •7.1. The nature of possession
- •7.1.1. Introduction
- •7.1.2. Possession, ownership and proprietary interests
- •7.1.3. What is possession?
- •7.1.3.1. Factual control
- •The relevance of title
- •The nature of the thing possessed
- •The purpose for which the thing is used
- •Control through agents and control of contents
- •7.1.3.2. Intention required
- •Intention to exclude
- •Effect of ignorance
- •Notes and Questions 7.1
- •7.2. Possession of land
- •7.2.1. Leases and licences
- •7.2.1.1. Why the distinction matters
- •7.2.1.2. Distinguishing leases from licences
- •Notes and Questions 7.2
- •7.2.2. Possession and particular use rights
- •7.2.2.1. General and particular use rights
- •7.2.2.2. Compatibility of particular and general use rights
- •7.3. Possession of goods: bailment
- •7.3.1. Nature of bailment
- •7.3.2. Rights, duties and obligations of bailor and bailee
- •7.4. Protection of possession
- •7.4.1. Protection of property rights by protection of possession
- •7.4.2. Tort and the protection of property rights
- •7.4.2.1. The role of tort in the protection of property rights
- •7.4.2.2. Scope of the property torts
- •Conversion
- •What amounts to a conversion of goods?
- •Remedies
- •Trespass
- •What amounts to trespass
- •Remedies
- •7.4.3. Self-help remedies
- •7.4.3.1. Survival of self-help remedies
- •7.4.3.2. Restrictions and deterrents
- •7.4.4. Unlawful eviction and harassment
- •7.4.5. Trespassing and the criminal law
- •Notes and Questions 7.3
- •8 Fragmentation of ownership
- •8.1. Introduction
- •8.2. Present and future interests
- •8.2.1. Interests in possession, in reversion and in remainder
- •8.2.2. Absolute entitlements, contingent entitlements and mere expectancies
- •8.2.2.1. Absolute entitlements
- •8.2.2.2. Contingent interests and expectancies
- •8.2.2.3. Alternative contingencies
- •8.2.3. When interests vest
- •8.2.4. Alienation, management and control
- •8.2.5. Interests of contingent duration
- •8.2.5.1. Determinable interests
- •8.2.5.2. Interests subject to a condition subsequent
- •8.2.5.3. Distinguishing determinable and forfeitable interests
- •8.2.6. Requirement of certainty
- •8.2.7. Successive interests in land and the doctrine of tenures and estates
- •8.2.7.1. Tenures and estates
- •8.2.7.2. Estates in particular use rights
- •8.2.7.3. Leases
- •8.2.8. Restrictions on the power to create future interests
- •8.3. Legal and equitable interests
- •8.3.1. Origin of the legal/equitable distinction
- •8.3.1.1. Failed formality interests
- •8.3.1.2. Novel interests
- •8.3.2. Legal and equitable interests now
- •8.3.2.1. Interests in land
- •8.3.2.2. Interests in goods
- •8.3.3. The significance of the legal/equitable distinction
- •8.3.4. Three common fallacies
- •8.3.4.1. Equitable interests and beneficial interests
- •8.3.4.2. Over-identification of equitable interests with trusts
- •8.3.4.3. Absolute ownership does not include equitable beneficial ownership
- •Notes and Questions 8.1
- •8.4. Fragmentation of management, control and benefit
- •8.4.1. Corporate property holding
- •8.4.2. Managerial property holding
- •8.4.2.1. Trust
- •The trustee
- •The settlor
- •The beneficiaries
- •8.4.2.2. Administration of property on death
- •8.4.2.3. Bankruptcy and liquidation
- •Notes and Questions 8.2
- •8.5. Group ownership
- •8.6. General and particular use rights
- •Notes and Questions 8.3
- •9 Recognition of new property interests
- •9.1. Why are certain interests regarded as property?
- •9.1.1. The function of property
- •9.1.1.1. As a means of allocating scarce resources
- •9.1.1.2. As an incentive to promote their management
- •9.1.1.3. As a moral, philosophical or political statement
- •9.1.2. The danger of property
- •9.1.3. The requirements of property
- •9.2. The dynamic nature of property
- •9.2.1. The recognition and limits of the covenant as a proprietary interest
- •Notes and Questions 9.1
- •9.2.2. The recognition of a proprietary right to occupy the matrimonial home
- •Notes and Questions 9.2
- •9.3. The general reluctance to recognise new property rights
- •9.3.1. The facts of Victoria Park Racing v. Taylor
- •9.3.2. The views of the majority
- •9.3.3. The views of the minority
- •9.3.4. The significance of the case
- •Notes and Questions 9.3
- •9.4. A comparative confirmation and an economic critique
- •Notes and Questions 9.4
- •9.5. The future of property
- •9.5.1. The new property thesis
- •Notes and Questions 9.5
- •Notes and Questions 9.6
- •10 Title
- •10.1. What we mean by ‘title’
- •10.2. Acquiring title: derivative and original acquisition of title
- •10.2.1. Derivative acquisition: disposition or grant
- •10.2.2. Original acquisition
- •10.3. Relativity of title
- •10.4. Proving title
- •10.4.1. Role of registration
- •10.4.2. Possession as a root of title
- •10.4.3. Provenance
- •10.4.4. Extinguishing title by limitation of action rules
- •10.4.5. Relativity of title and the ius tertii
- •10.5. The nemo dat rule
- •10.5.1. Scope of the nemo dat rule
- •10.5.2. General principles applicable to all property
- •10.5.2.1. Registration and the nemo dat rule
- •10.5.2.2. Dispositions to volunteers
- •10.5.2.3. Powers of sale
- •10.5.3. The application of the nemo dat rule to goods
- •10.5.4. The application of the nemo dat rule to money
- •10.5.5. The application of the nemo dat rule to land
- •10.5.5.1. The general principle
- •10.5.5.2. After-acquired property
- •10.5.5.3. Interests by estoppel
- •10.6. Legal and equitable title
- •11 Acquiring title by possession
- •11.1. Introduction
- •11.2. The operation of adverse possession rules
- •11.2.1. Unregistered land
- •11.2.2. Registered land
- •11.2.3. What counts as ‘adverse’ possession
- •11.2.4. Effect on third party interests
- •11.3. Why established possession should defeat the paper owner
- •11.4. Adverse possession and registration
- •11.5. Good faith and the adverse possessor
- •1. Tension between principle and proof
- •Notes and Questions 11.1
- •A. Lockean entitlement
- •B. Utilitarianism
- •C. Property and personhood
- •B. Property theory and adverse possession
- •Notes and Questions 11.2
- •Notes and Questions 11.3
- •Stale claims in registered land
- •Stale claims under the 2002 Act
- •Distinguishing the ‘good’ squatter from the ‘bad’ squatter
- •Problems of proof
- •Effect of the 2002 Act changes on the incidence of adverse possession
- •The incompatibility argument
- •Notes and Questions 11.4
- •11.6. Goods
- •11.6.1. Taking and theft
- •11.6.2. Protection of title by tort
- •11.6.3. The Limitation Act 1980 and title to goods
- •11.6.4. Finders
- •Notes and Questions 11.5
- •12 Transfer and grant
- •12.1. Derivative acquisition
- •12.2. Formalities
- •12.2.1. Nature and content of formalities rules
- •12.2.2. Registration and electronic transactions
- •12.2.3. Validity and enforceability against third parties
- •12.2.4. Effect of compliance on passing of title
- •12.2.5. Transactions excepted from formalities rules
- •12.2.5.1. Equitable modification of legal rules
- •12.2.5.2. Implied rights
- •12.2.5.3. Rights acquired by possession or prescription
- •12.2.6. Deeds and prescribed forms
- •12.2.7. Why have formalities rules
- •12.2.7.1. The evidentiary function
- •12.2.7.2. The cautionary function
- •12.2.7.3. The channelling function
- •12.2.7.4. Other functions
- •Clarifying terms
- •Publicity
- •State functions
- •12.2.8. Disadvantages
- •12.2.8.1. Hard cases
- •12.2.8.2. Costs
- •Notes and Questions 12.1
- •Notes and Questions 12.2
- •12.3. Contractual rights to property interests
- •12.3.1. Estate contracts and the rule in Walsh v. Lonsdale
- •12.3.2. Application to property other than land
- •12.3.3. The failed formalities rule
- •12.3.3.1. The general rule
- •12.3.3.2. The failed formalities rule as it applies to land
- •12.3.3.3. Failed formalities rule as it applies to other property
- •Notes and Questions 12.3
- •Notes and Questions 12.4
- •12.3.4. Options to purchase, rights of pre-emption and rights of first refusal
- •Notes and Questions 12.5
- •Notes and Questions 12.6
- •12.4. Unascertained property
- •12.4.1. The problem of identification
- •12.4.2. Unascertained goods
- •12.4.3. Other unascertained property
- •Notes and Questions 12.7
- •13 Acquiring interests by other methods
- •13.1. Introduction
- •13.2. The difference between adverse possession and prescription
- •13.3. Why long use should give rise to entitlement
- •13.4. Rationale
- •13.4.1. Ascendancy of the presumed grant rationale
- •13.4.2. Effect of the ‘revolting fiction’
- •13.5. When long use gives rise to a prescriptive right
- •13.5.1. The problem of negative uses
- •13.5.2. Rights that can be granted but not acquired by prescription
- •13.6. User as of right and the problem of acquiescence
- •13.7. The future of prescription
- •Recommendation in favour of abolition
- •Minority view in favour of retention
- •Notes and Questions 13.1
- •14 Enforceability and priority of interests
- •14.1. Rationale of enforceability and priority rules
- •14.2. Enforceability and priority rules
- •14.2.1. The basic rules
- •14.2.2. Impact of registration
- •Notes and Questions 14.1
- •14.3. The doctrine of notice
- •14.3.1. Notice
- •14.3.2. Good faith
- •14.3.3. Effectiveness of the doctrine of notice as an enforceability rule
- •Notes and Questions 14.2
- •14.4. Overreaching
- •14.4.1. Nature and scope of overreaching
- •14.4.2. Operation of overreaching
- •14.4.3. Overreaching the interests of occupying beneficiaries
- •14.4.4. Transactions capable of overreaching beneficiaries’ interests
- •14.4.5. The two-trustees rule
- •Introductory
- •Overreaching
- •Safeguard for beneficiaries
- •Change of circumstances
- •Protecting occupation of property
- •Principal recommendation
- •Notes and Questions 14.3
- •15 Registration
- •15.1. What are registration systems for?
- •15.2. Characteristics of the English land registration system
- •15.2.1. Privacy
- •15.2.2. Comprehensiveness
- •15.2.3. Boundaries
- •15.2.4. Restricted class of registrable interests
- •15.2.4.1. Distinguishing ‘substantive’ registration and ‘protection’ on the register
- •15.2.4.2. Registration
- •15.2.4.3. ‘Protection’ by notice or restriction
- •15.2.4.4. The overriding interest class
- •15.2.5. The mirror, curtain and guarantee principles
- •THE ‘MIRROR PRINCIPLE’
- •THE ‘CURTAIN PRINCIPLE’
- •15.2.6. Consequences of non-registration
- •Notes and Questions 15.1
- •Compulsory use of electronic conveyancing
- •Do-it-yourself conveyancing
- •The objective of the power
- •The application of the power
- •Notes and Questions 15.2
- •15.3. Enforceability and priority of interests under the Land Registration Act 2002
- •15.3.1. Registrable interests
- •15.3.2. All other interests
- •15.3.2.1. Enforceability
- •15.3.2.2. Priority
- •15.4. Overriding interests
- •15.4.1. Justifications for overriding interests
- •15.4.2. Principles to be applied
- •15.4.3. Overriding interests under the 2002 Act
- •15.4.4. Easements and profits
- •15.4.5. Interests of persons in actual occupation: the 1925 Act
- •15.4.5.1. What rights are covered?
- •5.4.5.2. Actual occupation
- •Physical presence
- •Personal occupation
- •Non-residential premises
- •15.4.6. Interests of persons in actual occupation: the 2002 Act
- •15.4.6.1. Causal link between interest and occupation
- •15.4.6.2. Meaning of ‘actual occupation’
- •15.4.6.3. The ‘notice’ element
- •15.4.6.4. Can minors be in actual occupation?
- •15.4.6.5. Occupation of part
- •15.4.7. Complexity
- •Notes and Questions 15.3
- •15.5. Indemnity
- •15.5.1. Function of indemnity
- •15.5.2. Shortfall in the provision of indemnity
- •15.5.3. Cost
- •17 Leases and bailment
- •17.1. Introduction
- •17.2. Leases and bailments compared
- •17.2.1. Consensuality
- •17.2.2. Contract
- •17.2.3. Enforcement
- •17.2.4. Duration and purpose
- •17.2.5. Beneficial use
- •17.2.6. Proprietary status
- •17.2.7. Inherent obligations of the possessor
- •17.3. Leases
- •17.3.1. Nature of the lease
- •17.3.1.1. Duration: the four basic categories
- •The legal position
- •Length of fixed-term leases in practice
- •Commonhold as an alternative to the long residential lease
- •Commercial premises
- •Assignment and premature termination of fixed-term lease
- •17.3.1.3. Periodic tenancies
- •Nature
- •Contractual fetters on notice to quit
- •17.3.1.4. Tenancy at will
- •Tenancy at sufferance
- •Notes and Questions 17.1
- •17.3.1.5. Certainty of duration
- •Notes and Questions 17.2
- •Passage 2
- •Passage 3
- •Passage 4
- •Notes and Questions 17.3
- •17.3.1.7. The tolerated trespasser status
- •Notes and Questions 17.4
- •Notes and Questions 17.5
- •17.3.2. Alienability
- •17.3.2.1. Inherent alienability
- •Alienability of tenant’s interest
- •Subleases and other derivative interests granted by the tenant
- •Effect of termination of lease on derivative interests
- •Alienability of landlord’s interest
- •Concurrent leases and other derivative interests granted by the landlord
- •17.3.2.2. Restrictions on alienability
- •17.3.2.3. Statutory control of contractual restrictions
- •Notes and Questions 17.6
- •17.3.3. Effect of alienation on enforceability
- •17.3.3.1. Introduction: the basic principle
- •Automatic transmission of benefit and burden of proprietary terms: the privity of estate principle
- •Post-assignment liability: the privity of contract principle
- •17.3.3.3. Derivative interest holders
- •17.4. Bailment
- •17.4.1. Essential features of bailment
- •17.4.2. Categories of bailment
- •17.4.3. Characteristics of bailment
- •17.4.4. Liabilities of the bailee
- •Notes and Questions 17.7
- •17.4.5. Is bailment proprietary?
- •17.4.5.1. Possession and exclusivity
- •17.4.5.2. Alienability
- •17.4.5.3. Enforceability against third parties
- •17.4.5.4. Other proprietary indicia
- •18 Security interests
- •18.1. The nature and function of security
- •18.1.1. Nature of security
- •18.1.1.1. Terminology problems
- •18.1.1.2. Legal and equitable rights to redeem
- •18.1.1.3. Creation, attachment and perfection of security
- •18.1.2. Function
- •18.1.2.1. Right of first recourse
- •18.1.2.2. Attachment to the asset
- •18.1.2.4. The hostage function
- •18.1.2.5. Signalling, monitoring and control
- •18.1.3. Efficiency
- •18.1.4. Use of security
- •18.2. Forms of security
- •18.2.1. Property transfer securities: the mortgage
- •18.2.2. Possessory securities: pledge or pawn
- •18.2.3. Hypothecations: the charge
- •18.2.4. Liens
- •18.2.5. Property retention securities
- •18.2.6. Charge by way of legal mortgage
- •Notes and Questions 18.1
- •18.3. Control over the terms of the relationship
- •18.3.1. Equitable supervisory jurisdiction
- •18.3.2. The Kreglinger principles
- •18.3.3. Statutory intervention
- •Notes and Questions 18.2
- •18.4. Enforcement of security
- •18.4.1. Remedies
- •18.4.2. Possession
- •18.4.3. Sale
- •18.4.3.1. When the power arises
- •18.4.3.2. When the power becomes exercisable
- •18.4.4. Duties on enforcement
- •General principles
- •The handling of arrears: initial action taken by lenders
- •Alleviating arrears problems
- •The levying of charges on accounts in arrear
- •Methods of obtaining possession
- •Proceeds of sale
- •Indemnity insurance
- •Loss recovery procedures
- •Notes and Questions 18.3
- •16 Co-ownership
- •16.1. Introduction
- •16.2.1. Basic concepts
- •OWNERSHIP IN COMMON
- •JOINT OWNERSHIP
- •CONCURRENT INTERESTS IN FINANCIAL ASSETS
- •CONCURRENT INTERESTS IN LAND
- •Notes and Questions 16.1
- •Unity of possession
- •Unity of interest
- •Unity of title
- •Unity of time
- •16.2.2. A comparison of joint tenancies and tenancies in common
- •16.2.2.1. Four unities versus one
- •Notes and Questions 16.2
- •16.2.2.2. The right of survivorship (and how to avoid it)
- •Severance at common law
- •16.2.2.3. Acting upon one’s share
- •16.2.2.4. Mutual agreement
- •16.2.2.5. Mutual conduct
- •16.2.2.6. Statutory severance
- •Notes and Questions 16.3
- •16.2.3. Use of co-owned property
- •16.2.3.1. Land
- •12 THE RIGHT TO OCCUPY
- •13 EXCLUSION AND RESTRICTION OF RIGHT TO OCCUPY
- •Notes and Questions 16.4
- •16.2.3.2. Chattels
- •Notes and Questions 16.5
- •16.2.4. Sale and other dispositions of co-owned property
- •16.2.4.1. Land
- •Notes and Questions 16.6
- •16.2.4.2. Chattels
- •16.3. Other forms of co-ownership
- •16.3.1. Commonhold
- •16.3.2. Unincorporated associations
- •Notes and Questions 16.7
- •16.3.3. Extending the limits of co-ownership: public trusts
- •Bibliography
- •Index
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Europe (Denmark was top with 70 per cent of GDP and Italy bottom with 10 per cent: European Mortgage Federation).
During the eleven-year period from 1991 to 2002, enforcement of mortgages of dwellings ranged from a low of 11,970 (0.11 per cent of total mortgages) in 2002 to a high of 75,540 (0.77 per cent of total mortgages) in 1991.
Comparable statistics are not available for security interests over other assets, but the Department of Trade and Industry’s annual report for 2002/2003 shows that between 150,000 and 250,000 new mortgages and charges have been granted by companies every year since 1998. Most businesses are largely reliant on bank finance, and all UK banks routinely require security over business assets as a condition of extending credit.
18.2. Forms of security
It is important to keep in mind that the grant of a security interest generally involves two distinct transactions. By the first transaction, D borrows money from C or incurs some other obligation to C. By the second transaction, O, the holder of a property interest in an asset, grants C a security interest over it in order to secure D’s obligations under the first transaction. O and D may, but will not necessarily, be the same person: you can mortgage your house to the bank to secure your own indebtedness to the bank or, if you want, to secure someone else’s indebtedness.
Security interests that are granted consensually in this way must take one of four forms, as noted above. The significance of the differences between these forms appears from Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1998] 2 WLR 131 (extracted at www.cambridge.org/propertylaw/). An outline of the salient points follows.
18.2.1. Property transfer securities: the mortgage
Any property interest in any kind of asset can be mortgaged – i.e. any legal or equitable interest in land, in goods, or in any kind of intangible property. In the case of a mortgage of anything other than a legal estate in land, O mortgages her property interest to C by transferring it to C, with a proviso that C will transfer it back to O when the obligation is discharged. Since the transfer of title is by way of security only (i.e. for C to hold as security for performance of the obligation, rather than for C’s own beneficial use), O is regarded by equity as retaining a proprietary interest (an ‘equity of redemption’) in the mortgaged property. This is a sui generis property interest, which amounts to an acknowledgment by equity that the mortgagor remains the ‘true’ owner notwithstanding the transfer of her interest to the mortgagee.
In other words, in a mortgage the mortgagor transfers ownership of the asset (or the whole of her interest, if less than ownership) to the mortgagee, retaining only the equity of redemption. In the case of goods, since ownership carries with it the right to possession of the goods, it is the mortgagee and not the mortgagor who is entitled to possession of the asset throughout the period of the mortgage. These
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two factors combine to make the mortgage a most unsuitable form of security for goods, particularly from the mortgagor’s point of view: she loses possession of the asset throughout the period of the mortgage, even if she does not make any default in repayment, and she has only an equitable interest in the asset which would not be enforceable against a good faith purchaser if the mortgagee were to sell the asset pretending it was his own. This creates problems, because none of the other forms of security is particularly suitable for goods either. The pawn tends to be used only for small, short-term domestic borrowings, as we see below, and the charge can only exist as an equitable interest, which leaves the chargee in a dangerously exposed position, with his interest not enforceable against a good faith purchaser if the chargor sells the goods without his consent.
Mortgages can be legal or equitable. A mortgage of a legal interest can be either legal or equitable depending on the formalities used (see Chapter 12 above). A mortgage of an equitable interest can only be equitable.
Since 1925, a legal mortgage of a legal estate in land (i.e. a fee simple absolute in possession or a legal lease) takes a special form, which we look at separately below.
18.2.2. Possessory securities: pledge or pawn
O pledges or pawns property by retaining title to it but delivering possession to C by way of security, on the condition that possession will be redelivered when the obligation is discharged. Since a pledge or pawn necessarily involves a delivery of possession, the only kinds of property that can be pledged or pawned are chattels and some documentary intangibles (in theory probably land as well, but never in practice). Again, the fact that pawn involves the delivery of possession limits its usefulness for commercial borrowers, but pawnbroking remains a thriving institution among consumer borrowers, providing relatively small loans for short periods usually against the security of personal belongings.
18.2.3. Hypothecations: the charge
A charge is the most sophisticated form of security. It has always been recognised in civil law systems but was never recognised by the common law. It was finally introduced into English law by equity, and as a consequence charges can only be equitable (leaving aside some statutory charges). A charge does not involve a transfer of ownership or a delivery of possession to C. Instead, what C gets is a sui generis proprietary interest in the charged property interest, which consists of a present right of first recourse to it in the event of a default in the performance of the obligation secured by the charge. So, from the moment the charge is created, the charged property is appropriated to, or earmarked for, the satisfaction of C’s claim in priority to any other claim that anyone else might have in respect of it.
In many ways, the charge is the ideal form of security, since it gives the chargee only and precisely the rights it needs as against the security asset – i.e. a present right to have recourse to the asset only as and when there has been a default under the loan agreement and the chargee therefore wants to enforce the security. This is
Security interests 665
in marked contrast to the cumbersome common law mortgage, which gives the mortgagee the inappropriately extensive rights of ownership of the security from the outset long before the mortgagee needs or even wants them. The disadvantage in our system, however, is the purely equitable status of the charge, as noted above.
Any kind of property interest can be charged. A charge may be ‘fixed’ (attached to a specific asset) or ‘floating’ (floating over all assets of a specified description from time to time owned by O). When a specified event (e.g. default in repayment) occurs, a floating charge ‘crystallises’, i.e. it attaches as a fixed charge to every asset of that description which O then owns. Floating charges, like fixed charges, are equitable only, and they can only be created by companies: an individual cannot grant a floating charge over her assets. The juridical nature of the floating charge is controversial, as can be seen from Agnew v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [2001] UKPC 28, PC (extracted at www.cambridge.org/propertylaw/).
18.2.4. Liens
The term ‘lien’ covers a variety of different, very specialised types of security interest, but the essential idea of a lien is that C becomes entitled to detain property of O until O’s obligation is fulfilled, as Lord Millett explains in Re Cosslett. Most liens are non-consensual (e.g. maritime liens, unpaid vendor’s lien, repairer’s lien, solicitor’s lien) but they can be created by agreement.
18.2.5. Property retention securities
A sale of property by S to B may be structured in such a way that title or possession passes to B before the full purchase price is paid, but S retains a proprietary interest in the property to be sold pending full payment. The interest retained by S in such a transaction (e.g. under a hire-purchase or conditional sale agreement, or a retention of title clause) is in all essentials a security interest, but the courts have sometimes been sympathetic towards attempts to characterise it as something else (most notably, in Aluminium Industrie Vaassen BV v. Romalpa Aluminium
[1976] 1 WLR 676, where the court accepted that the seller’s nominal retention of title until paid in full did not amount to a charge created by the buyer; this led to the widespread adoption of such provisions in continuing supply contracts: see Goode, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency in Sales Transactions, pp. 84–110).
18.2.6. Charge by way of legal mortgage
This is now, in practice at least, the only way of creating a legal security interest over a fee simple or leasehold interest in land. In order to understand the way it functions it is, unfortunately, necessary to understand its historical origins.
Until 1925, the ordinary property-transfer mortgage noted in section 18.2.1 above was used to mortgage fee simples and leases in English law. However, in 1925 it was thought that this form of mortgage would not fit well into the land registration system introduced by the Land Registration Act 1925, because under such a mortgage the owner has only an equitable (and therefore unregistrable)
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interest, i.e. the equity of redemption. It was therefore decided to replace it with a new charge-like security interest, the charge by way of legal mortgage. However, it was feared that the immediate and compulsory replacement of the mortgage with this new type of security interest would be too radical a step for most lenders to take willingly. The mortgage by demise, a less radical modification of the propertytransfer mortgage, was therefore also introduced at the same time, as an alternative to the charge by way of legal mortgage. It was anticipated that, as the advantages of the new charge by way of legal mortgage became apparent, use of the mortgage by demise would decline and it would eventually fall into disuse. This did indeed happen. It became obsolete (in about the 1960s or 1970s), and the Law Commission recommended its abolition in its report, Transfer of Land: Land Mortgages (Law Commission Report No. 204, 1991). This has not yet happened, but the Land Registration Act 2002 has now made it impossible to create a mortgage by demise over a registered title (see section 23(1) of the 2002 Act). Since a legal mortgage of a registrable estate is an event that triggers first registration of title, as we saw in Chapter 15, this means that in practice a mortgage by demise can no longer be created, even if anyone wanted to do so. However, its ghost lives on, because in the Law of Property Act 1925 the charge by way of legal mortgage is defined in terms of the mortgage by demise: section 87(1) provides that:
Where a legal mortgage of land is created by a charge . . . by way of legal mortgage, the mortgagee shall have the same protection, powers and remedies . . . as if [the mortgage was a mortgage by demise].
Since nothing else is said in the 1925 Act about the nature of this new statutory creation, the charge by way of legal mortgage, or the rights, duties and obligations of the parties to it, this can only mean that they are the same as they would have been under a mortgage by demise, and indeed this is the approach that the courts have always adopted (see, for example, Grand Junction Co. Ltd v. Bates [1954] 2 QB 160, Regent Oil Co. Ltd v. J. A. Gregory (Hatch End) Ltd [1966] Ch 402, and
Thompson v. Salah [1972] 1 All ER 530).
It therefore remains necessary to understand the mortgage by demise. The idea behind it was to modify the property-transfer mortgage only so far as necessary to give both mortgagor and mortgagee a legal registrable interest. Consequently, section 85(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that the mortgage by demise operates as a grant to the mortgagee of a legal lease of the land for a term of 3,000 years, but subject to ‘cesser on redemption’ (i.e. the term automatically terminates on repayment of the indebtedness). This leaves the mortgagor with a technically unwieldy bundle of rights consisting of a legal freehold reversion on a 3,000-year lease, plus an equity of redemption, plus an equitable right to redeem. These are, therefore, the rights that mortgagor and mortgagee have under a charge by way of legal mortgage. As the Law Commission pointed out in paragraphs 2.17–2.18 of Transfer of Land: Land Mortgages (Law Commission Report No. 204, 1991), this is deeply unsatisfactory since it leaves both parties with inappropriate rights:
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I N A P P R O P R I A T E N E S S O F F O R M
2.17. The second root cause of the artificiality and complexity of mortgage law is that the methods used to create security interests in land give rise to inappropriate relationships between the parties. This is particularly apparent in the mortgage by demise . . .
M O R T G A G E B Y D E M I S E
2.18. The problem here is of central importance because it affects not only the mortgage by demise, but also the charge by way of legal mortgage which is treated by statute as if it were a mortgage by demise, and the equitable mortgage of a legal estate, which is treated in equity as if it were a legal mortgage, and hence a mortgage by demise. The problem is that it creates a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. There is nothing unusual about using the leasehold relationship as an investment device: institutional lenders are probably more likely to use leases rather than mortgages as a means of financing property development or investing in nonresidential land. However, in the case of the mortgage by demise the leasehold relationship is the wrong way round: as tenant, the mortgagee has an inherent right to possession which would more appropriately lie with the mortgagor (subject to whatever restrictions may be necessary to protect and enforce the security). Similarly, it is necessary for the preservation of the security that the mortgagor should be under a duty to the mortgagee to keep the property repaired and insured, yet this is a duty more usually imposed by a landlord on a tenant, rather than by a tenant on a landlord. Even if reversed, the landlord–tenant relationship is fundamentally different from that created by a mortgage: investors under a lease-based arrangement buy outright a share in the property, and the value of the share fluctuates in direct proportion to the value of the retained property; mortgagee-investors, on the other hand, have an interest in the property only for the temporary purpose of safeguarding the repayment of a loan or performance of an obligation, and the value of the mortgagee’s interest can never exceed the value of the obligation secured. Historically, the mortgage by demise was a useful device to bridge the gap between abolition of the mortgage by assignment and general acceptance of the legal charge. Now that it has fulfilled that purpose, it seems an unnecessary impoverishment of the system to blur the distinction between lease and mortgage by continuing to define one device in terms of the other.
In the charge by way of legal mortgage (and indeed the mortgage by demise), significant modifications are made by the Law of Property Act 1925 to the basic leasehold relationship created by the security. So, for example, the mortgagee is given a statutory power to sell the mortgagor’s interest in the land free from the mortgage (section 101(1)(i): applies to all mortgages and charges made by deed) and the mortgagor is given a limited statutory power to grant leases (section 99: without such a power it would lack the capacity to do so). Also, as we see later, sometimes equity will modify the mortgagee’s common law rights to make them exercisable only for the protection or enforcement of the security. And finally the parties may, and frequently do, exclude or vary both the common law rights and the statutory modifications of them by express provision in the mortgage documents.